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There   is   a   long   tradition   in   philosophy   of   exploring   analogies   between   the  
modal,   the   temporal,   and   the   personal.1   This   short   book   is   an   excellent  
addition  to  that  tradition.  It’s  clear,  elegantly  written,  entertaining  (in  fact  it  is  
quite  the  page  turner),  and  chock-­‐‑full  of  interesting  philosophical  ideas.  
   The  main   thesis   that  Hare   defends   is  what   he   calls   egocentric   presentism.  
This  is  (roughly)  the  view  that  the  world  contains  one  particular  subject  who  
is   special.   Hare   thinks   that   this   one,   special   subject   is   himself,   but   he  
encourages  you  to  think  it  is  you,  and  in  general  he  thinks  it  makes  sense  for  
each  subject  to  think  of  himself  or  herself  as  the  special  one.  In  what  follows,  I  
will  take  egocentric  presentism  to  be  about  you.  
   In  what  way  does  egocentric  presentism  maintain  that  you  are  special?  In  
a   way   that   is   perfectly   analogous   to   the   way   in   which   The   A-­‐‑Theory   in  
philosophy  of   time  maintains   that   the  present   time   is   special.   Just  as  The  A-­‐‑
Theory   maintains   that   there   is   a   unique,   monadic   property,   temporal  
                                                                                                              
1   See,   for   example,   Aristotle’s   Physics,   esp.   Books   VI-­‐‑VIII;   Arthur   Prior,   Time   and  
Modality  (Oxford  University  Press,  1957);  Arthur  Prior  and  Kit  Fine,  Worlds,  Times  and  
Selves   (University   of   Massachusetts   Press,   1977);   Sarah   Waterlow,   Passage   and  
Possibility   (Oxford   University   Press,   1982);   Edward   N.   Zalta,   “On   the   Structural  
Similarities  Between  Worlds  and  Times,”  Philosophical  Studies  51   (1987),  pp.   213-­‐‑239;  
Heather  Dyke,  “Real  Times  and  Possible  Worlds”  (in  Robin  LePoidevin,  ed.,  Questions  
of   Time   and   Tense   (Oxford   University   Press,   1998),   pp.   93-­‐‑118);   Ned   Markosian,  
“Review  of  LePoidevin,  Questions  of  Time  and  Tense,”  Nous  35  (2001),  pp.  616-­‐‑629;  Ned  
Markosian,   “A  Defense   of   Presentism”   (in  Dean  Zimmerman,   ed.,  Oxford   Studies   in  
Metaphysics,  Vol.  1  (Oxford  University  Press,  2004),  pp.  47-­‐‑82);  and  A.A.  Rini  and  M.J.  
Cresswell,  The  World-­‐‑Time  Parallel  (Cambridge  University  Press,  2012).  
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presentness,   that   is   instantiated  by  certain  events  and  objects  (namely,  all  and  
only  the  ones  that  occupy  the  present  time),  so  too  does  egocentric  presentism  
maintain  that   there   is  a  unique,  monadic  property,  presence   (as  Hare  calls   it),  
that   is   instantiated   by   certain   events   and   objects,   namely,   all   and   only   your  
experiences  and  the  objects  of  those  experiences.  
   To  be  clear,  it  is  not  merely  that  your  experiences  and  their  objects  stand  in  
the   two-­‐‑place   relation   present-­‐‑relative-­‐‑to   to   you.   Everyone   is   such   that   his   or  
her  experiences  (and  the  objects  of  those  experiences)  stand  in  this  two-­‐‑place  
relation   to  him-­‐‑  or  herself.  Hare’s  view   is   that,   in  addition   to  all  of   the   facts  
about  whose  experiences  are  present  relative  to  whom,  there  are  also  a  bunch  
of  extra  facts  about  whose  experiences  are  present  simpliciter.  (He  emphasizes  
that  his  view  is  in  this  way  analogous  to  The  A-­‐‑Theory,  with  its  commitment  
to   a   bunch   of   extra   “A-­‐‑facts”   about   which   objects   and   events   are   present  
simpliciter.)  And  it   is  these  extra  facts  that  make  you  special  among  all  of  the  
subjects   in   the   world,   according   to   Hare.   You   are   the   one   with   present  
experiences.  
   Why  should  you  believe  egocentric  presentism?  On  Myself,  and  Other,  Less  
Important   Subjects   (hereafter,   OMOLIS)   contains   four   main   reasons   for  
accepting  this  odd  metaphysical  doctrine:  (i)  a  main  motivation,  (ii)  an  official  
main   argument,   (iii)   an  unofficial  main   argument,   and   (iv)   an  unauthorized  
argument.  
   (i)   The   main   motivation   for   egocentric   presentism.   Most   of   us   have   certain  
egocentric   preferences.   “All   other   things   being   equal,   we   prefer   that   pain  
befall   others   rather   than   ourselves   and  pleasure   befall   ourselves   rather   than  
others.”   (OMOLIS,   p.   2.)   If   someone   is   going   to   suffer   from   boiling   water  
spilled  on  his  or  her  hand,  we  prefer   that   it  be  someone  else.  Hare  calls   this  
preference   mild   egocentric   hedonism.   But   we   also   have   a   preference   for   the  
greater  good  –  all  things  being  equal,  we  prefer  that  there  be  less  rather  than  
more  pain   in   the  world  overall,   and  also   that   there  be  more   rather   than   less  
pleasure   in   the   world   overall.   Hare   doesn’t   have   a   name   for   this   common  
preference,  but  we  might  call   it  a  preference  for   the  greater  good.  And  these  
two   preferences   can   conflict   with   one   another.   The   main   motivation   of  
OMOLIS  is  to  reconcile  these  two  seemingly  conflicting  preferences.  
   Here’s   the   idea.   Many   of   us   have   various   time-­‐‑biased   preferences.   For  
example,  all  other  things  being  equal,  we  prefer  pain  to  be  in  the  past  rather  
than  the  future,  and  we  prefer  pain  to  be  in  the  distant  future  rather  than  the  
near   future.   But   we   also   prefer   that   the   universe   contain   less   pain   overall  
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throughout  its  history  (since  we  have  a  preference  for  the  greater  good).  And  
these  two  preferences  can  conflict.  Luckily  there  is  a  natural  way  to  reconcile  
the   relevant   preferences.   It’s   called   The   A-­‐‑Theory.   For   if   we   say   that   there  
really  are  objective  facts  about  which  times  are  past,  present,  and  future,  then  
we  can  maintain  that  present  pain  has  more  disvalue  than  future  pain  which  
has  more  disvalue  than  past  pain,  and  so  on.  And  in  this  way,  we  can  appeal  
to  a  certain  view  about  the  metaphysics  of  time  to  get  the  result  that  our  time-­‐‑
biased  preferences  are  perfectly  consistent  with  our  preference  for  the  greater  
good.  Problem  solved.  
   Likewise,  we  can  appeal  to  a  certain  view  about  the  metaphysics  of  people  
(namely,   egocentric   presentism)   to   get   the   result   that   our   mild   egocentric  
hedonism   is   consistent   with   our   preference   for   the   greater   good,   after   all.  
Since  present  pains  (i.e.,   the  ones  that   instantiate   the  property  presence,  a.k.a.  
your  pains)  have  more  disvalue   than   the  pains  experienced  by  others,   it   can  
turn   out   that   your   preference   that   x   number   of   Russians,   rather   than   you,  
suffer  pain  from  accidents  with  boiling  water  is  perfectly  consistent  with  your  
preference  for  the  greater  good.  Problem  solved!  
   I   have   two  main   reactions   to   this   line  of   reasoning,   and   I   am  afraid   that  
neither  one  involves  being  persuaded  by  it.  My  first  reaction  is  that  endorsing  
a  metaphysical   theory   in  order   to  get   the   result   that  my  various  preferences  
are  all  compatible  with  one  another  is  not  the  right  way  to  do  metaphysics.  I  
want   arguments   for   my   metaphysical   views,   preferably   with   metaphysical  
premises,  and  I  want   those  arguments   to  give  me  reasons   to   think   that   their  
conclusions  are  actually   true.  My  second  reaction   to   this   line  of   reasoning   is  
that  the  problem  it’s  meant  to  solve  was  never  really  a  problem  to  begin  with.  
I   have  many  preferences,   and   they   are   not   all   compatible  with   one   another.  
This  makes  me   irrational   in  a  certain  sense.  So  sue  me.  But   it   is  no  big  deal,  
and  it  is  certainly  no  cause  to  start  endorsing  strange  metaphysical  theories  in  
a  misguided   attempt   to   achieve   some   kind   of   harmony   among  my   various  
preferences.  
   (ii)   The   official  main   argument   for   egocentric   presentism.  Hare   admits   at   the  
beginning   of   Chapter   5   that   the   above   reason   for   endorsing   egocentric  
presentism  may   seem   to   some   like   little  more   than  wishful   thinking.   So   he  
also   offers   the   kind   of   argument   from   metaphysical   premises   to   a  
metaphysical   conclusion   that   I   mentioned   in   the   previous   paragraph.   The  
argument,  in  short,  is  that  egocentric  presentism  allows  one  to  make  sense  of  
some  seemingly  conflicting  intuitions  concerning  personal   identity  that  Hare  
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reports  having   (and  apparently   expects  many  of  us   to   share).  The   intuitions  
concern   a   case   in   which   the   brain   of   a   person,   Adam,   is   replaced   with   a  
rudimentary,  silicon  pseudo-­‐‑brain  –  able  to  “control  the  body’s  vital  functions  
and   support   a   minimal   substrate   of   perceptual   experience   (think  
Frankenstein’s   monster,   minus   the   ability   to   talk)”   –   while   a   duplicate   of  
Adam   is   simultaneously   created   in   the  next   room.2   (Hare  dubs   the   result   of  
the   replacement   of   Adam’s   brain   with   a   rudimentary,   silicon   pseudo-­‐‑brain  
“Sili-­‐‑Brain”  and  the  duplicate  of  Adam  who  is  created  in  the  next  room  “Tele-­‐‑
Product”.)  The  first  intuition  Hare  reports  having  concerns  what  would  seem  
true  “from  the  inside”  (i.e.,  from  the  point  of  view  of  Adam  before  the  bizarre  
surgery).  And  what  would   seem   true   from   the   inside,   according   to  Hare,   is  
that   he   might   very   well   experience   next   what   Tele-­‐‑Product   will   be  
experiencing,  and  also  that  he  might  very  well  experience  next  what  Sili-­‐‑Brain  
will  be  experiencing.  
   Meanwhile,  Hare  reports  that  what  seems  true  to  him  “from  the  outside”  
(i.e.,  from  a  third-­‐‑person  point  of  view)  is  that  it  is  not  possible  that  Adam  is  
identical   to  Sili-­‐‑Brain.   (Hare’s  reason  is   that  he   is  convinced  that  “people  are  
wholly  physical   things,  with  persistence  conditions  given  by  some  form  of  a  
reductionist   psychological   approach   to   personal   identity   over   time.”  
(OMOLIS,  p.  85.))  
   These   intuitions   seem   incompatible,   but   Hare   argues   that   they   are  
perfectly  consistent  if  egocentric  presentism  is  true.  The  reason  has  to  do  with  
what  he   takes   to  be   the  correct  account  of  what   it  would  seem  like   from  the  
inside,   if   Hare   were   in   Adam’s   position.   If   Hare   were   in   that   unfortunate  
circumstance,  he  says,  then  it  would  seem  to  him  that  the  unique  property  of  
presence  might   jump   from  his   current   brain   and   body   (namely,  Adam’s)   to  
Tele-­‐‑Product,   and   it   would   also   seem   to   him   that   the   property   of   presence  
might   jump   from   Adam   to   Sili-­‐‑Brain.   And   this   is   because   both   outcomes  
would   indeed   be   metaphysically   possible.   But   there   is   no   conflict   between  
saying  this  and  saying  that  it  is  not  metaphysically  possible  that  Adam  will  be  
Sili-­‐‑Brain.  In  other  words,  presence  might  jump  from  Adam  to  someone  who  
is  not  the  same  person  as  Adam.  
   Now,   many   philosophers   don’t   share   Hare’s   specific   intuitions   about  
personal   identity.   (Eric   Olson,   for   example,   is   convinced   that   Adam   is   Sili-­‐‑
                                                                                                              
2  OMOLIS,  p.  58.  
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Brain,   and   could   not   possibly   be   Tele-­‐‑Product.3)   But   Hare’s   argument   is  
perhaps  best  understood  in  a  way  that  is  independent  of  his  specific  intuitions  
about   this   case.   All   his   argument   needs   is   the   claim   that   it   is   possible   that  
what  would  seem  true  from  the  inside  in  one  of  these  cases  can  be  inconsistent  
with  what  would  seem  true  from  the  outside.  And  Hare’s  argument  is  that  if  
egocentric  presentism  is   true  then  there   is  no  conflict   in  saying  both  of   these  
things,  since  the  claim  about  what  would  seem  true  from  the  inside  is  a  claim  
about  what  might  happen  with  respect  to  the  property  of  presence,  while  the  
claim  about  what  would  seem  true  from  the  outside  is  a  claim  about  identity  
over  time,  which  is  a  completely  different  topic.  
   My   main   objection   to   this   argument   is   that   there   are   other   ways   to  
reconcile  the  apparent  conflict  between  what  would  seem  true  from  the  inside  
and  what  would  seem  true  from  the  outside.  Here  is  my  favorite.  If  I  were  in  
Adam’s   situation,   I   would   think   that  my   next   experiences  will   probably   be  
those  of  Sili-­‐‑Brain,   that  my  next  experiences  might  be   those  of  Tele-­‐‑Product,  
and   also   that   it   is   not   possible   that   I   will   turn   out   to   be   identical   to   Tele-­‐‑
Product.  But  it  would  also  seem  to  me  that  I  might  be  fairly  wrong  about  any  
one,  or  even  all  three,  of  these  judgments.  After  all,  one  should  always  have  a  
healthy   lack  of  confidence   in  one’s  metaphysical   judgments,  and  one  should  
never  have  a  credence  of  1  in  any  such  judgment.4  Moreover,  there  is  nothing  
wrong,  or  unusual,  about  having  nonzero  credences  in  each  of  two  competing  
propositions,   even   if   you   are   certain   that   at   least   one   of   them   must   be  
necessarily  false.  
   (iii)   The   unofficial   main   argument   for   egocentric   presentism.   When   Hare  
officially   introduces   his   full-­‐‑blown   version   of   egocentric   presentism,   in  
Chapter   3,   he   employs   a   thought   experiment.  He   imagines   going   through   a  
Cartesian   epistemological   process   that   involves   throwing   out   all   of   his   old  
beliefs  and  starting  over  from  scratch,  accepting  only  what  appears  to  him  to  
be   certain.   The   process,   as   he   describes   it,   involves   a   series   of   insights  
beginning  with  the  following.  
  
                                                                                                              
3  See  Olson,  The  Human  Animal  (Oxford  University  Press,  1997).  
4  If  I  am  being  really  careful  about  my  credences,  I  should  probably  try  to  make  sure  
that   the  sum  of  my  credence   that   I  will  be  Sili-­‐‑Brain  and  my  credence   that   I  will  be  
Tele-­‐‑Product   is   less   than   or   equal   to   1.   But   doing   so   is   presumably   consistent  with  




There  are  some  things.  Seemingly:  a  painting  of  Saint  George  and  the  
Dragon,   a   telephone,   a   diary,   a   facial   itch.   Their   nature   remains  
obscure…  All   that   can  be   said   for   sure   is   that   these   things,  whatever  
they  are,  reveal  themselves  at  this,  first  stage  of  the  Cartesian  exercise.  
They  are  present.  
  
Insight  2:  
There  is  a  sentient  being,  CJH,  with  all  and  only  the  present  things  as  
perceptual   objects.   CJH   sees   the   telephone,   painting,   and   diary.   CJH  
feels  the  itch.  (OMOLIS,  p.  21.)  
  
Later,  in  Chapter  4,  Hare  reminds  us  of  his  Cartesian  thought  experiment.  
  
In  an  effort   to  give  you  a  grip   [on   the  notion  of  monadic  presence],   I  
asked   you   to   try   out   some   Cartesian   introspection:   Wipe   your  
epistemic  slate  clean.  Forget  where  you  are,  forget  who  you  are,  forget  
that   you   are   anybody   at   all.  Now  attend   to   the  world.  You  will   find  
that   there   are   certain   things.   Take   their   appearing   at   this   stage   of  
introspection   to   be   a   feature   of   the   things,   not   a   feature   of   how   they  
appear  to  you.  They  are  present.  (OMOLIS,  p.  50.)  
  
   As   Hare   himself   presents   these   considerations,   they   are   not   explicitly  
offered   as   an   argument,   or   even   a   part   of   an   argument,   for   egocentric  
presentism.5   But   I   think   it   is   easy   to   find   oneself   being   pulled   by   these  
remarks  in  that  direction.  All  you  can  know  for  certain  is  that  you  exist,  along  
with  your  experiences  and  the  objects  of  your  experiences.  It  seems  likely  that  
other   selves   also   exist,   with   experiences   of   their   own;   but   none   of   that   is  
certain.  Thus,  what   seems  strikingly  different  about   the  experiences  of   those  
other  apparent  selves  is  that  they  merely  stand  in  a  two-­‐‑place  relation  (present-­‐‑
relative-­‐‑to)   to   their   subjects,  whereas  your  experiences   instantiate   the   special,  
monadic   property   presence.   And   in   this   way   the   Cartesian   line   of   thought  
seems  to  point  toward  egocentric  presentism.  
                                                                                                              
5   It   is   clear,   though,   that  Mark   Johnston,   in   the   book’s   Introduction,   does   take   the  
Cartesian  thought  experiment  to  be  a  part  of  the  main  argument  for  the  book’s  thesis.  
(More  on  Johnston’s  Introduction  below.)  
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   Like  I  said,  Hare  does  not  explicitly  offer  this  Cartesian  line  of  thought  as  
an  argument  for  egocentric  presentism,  and  I  think  it  is  probably  a  good  thing  
that  he  doesn’t,  for  the  relevant  argument  strikes  me  as  a  bad  one.  It’s  not  that  
your   evidence,   when   you   apply   the   proper   Cartesian-­‐‑level   standards   of  
certainty  for  justification,  supports  believing  that  you  are  special,  the  only  one  
with  genuinely  present  experiences,  The  One.  Instead,  your  evidence  supports  
believing  that  you  are  one  of  many  conscious,  physical  objects  with  subjective  
experiences.  Why?  Because  your   evidence   supports   believing   that   you   are   a  
conscious   human   body,   and   also   that   there   are  many   other   organisms  with  
conscious   experiences,   including   salamanders,   snakes,   and   seals   (not   to  
mention   a   few   billion   other   humans).   So   your   evidence   supports   the  
hypothesis   that   you   are   one   among   many   conscious   organisms,   and   that  
presence   is   a   two-­‐‑place   relation   between   an   experience   or   an   object   and   a  
conscious  organism.  Or  so  it  seems  to  me.  
   (iv)  The  unauthorized   argument   for   egocentric   presentism.   There   is   one  other  
notable   argument   for   egocentric  presentism   to  be   found  within   the  pages  of  
this  book,  although  it  is  not  contained  in  the  part  of  the  book  by  Hare.  It  is  in  
the  Introduction,  which  is  written  by  Mark  Johnston.6  
  
      Here  it  is  crucial  to  realize  that  Hare  is  in  effect  assuming  a  version  of  
what  philosophers  have  called  the  “no-­‐‑self”  or  “no-­‐‑ownership”  theory,  
namely,  that  the  presentations  of  objects  and  experiences  that  make  up  
our  conscious  life  are  not  presentations  of  objects  and  experiences  to  a  
subject  or  self…  
  
      …   If  presence   is  never  presence   to   someone  or  other,   if  objects  and  
experiences  are  just  present  sans  phrase,  then  the  only  thing  to  conclude  
from   reflection   on   one’s   own   scalding   and   the   scaldings   of   all   those  
unfortunate  Russians   is   that  while  one’s  own  pains  are  present,   their  
pains  are  not  present.  (Johnston,  Introduction  to  OMOLIS,  pp.  xii-­‐‑xiii.)  
  
                                                                                                              
6  I  call  this  the  unauthorized  argument  for  egocentric  presentism  because,  although  it  
is  suggested  by  Johnston  in  the  Introduction  to  the  book,  I  am  not  able  to  find  it  in  the  
main  text.  (Johnston  quite  appropriately  cites  and  quotes  Hume  when  introducing  the  
no-­‐‑self  view.  I  find  it  telling  that  Hare  himself  never  cites  or  quotes  Hume.)  
8  
  
   This  does  seem  like  a  powerful  argument  for  egocentric  presentism.  But  of  
course   the   easiest   way   to   resist   it   is   to   deny   the   no-­‐‑self   view.7   And   as   I  
mentioned   above,   it   seems   to  me   that  my   evidence   supports   the   hypothesis  
that  I  am  a  conscious  organism  (and  hence  a  self)  in  a  world  with  many  other  
conscious  beings.  
  
   I  would  like  to  close  by  raising  one  final  line  of  questioning  that  Hare  does  
not   address   in   OMOLIS.   What,   according   to   egocentric   presentism,   is   the  
metaphysical   mechanism   or   backstory   for   the   alleged   fact   that   presence  
attaches  to  the  experiences  of  just  one  person?  Why  should  that  be  true?  And  
given   that   it   is   true,   why   is   it   that   it   is   this   one   person   whose   experiences  
presence  attaches   to,   rather   than  someone  else?   If  you  are  a   standard  modal  
actualist  with  ersatz  possible  worlds,  so  that  you  think  of  the  one  actual  world  
among   the   many   abstract   possible   worlds   as   being   made   true   (and   thus  
actual)  by   the  one  concrete  world,   then  you  will  have  an  easy  answer   to   the  
modal   analogue  of   this   line   of   questioning.8  Likewise,   if   you   are   a   standard  
presentist  with  ersatz  times,  so  that  you  think  of  the  one  present  time  among  
the  many   abstract   times   as   being  made   true   (and   thus   present)   by   the   one  
concrete  world,  then  you  will  have  an  easy  answer  to  the  temporal  analogue  
of   this   line   of   questioning.9   But   it   is   difficult   to   see   how   the   egocentric  
presentist  is  supposed  to  respond  to  this  line  of  questioning.10  
  
  
                                                                                                              
7  There  are  other  ways  to  resist  the  argument.  For  example,  the  proponent  of  the  no-­‐‑
self  view  may  insist  that  all  experiences  –  whether  coincident  with  these  experiences  
here   or   coincident   with   other   experiences,   elsewhere   –   are   on   a   par;   they   are   all  
equally  present.  (Thanks  to  Ted  Sider  for  this  point.)  
8  For  a  discussion  of  this  approach  see  David  Lewis,  On  the  Plurality  of  Worlds   (Basil  
Blackwell,  1986).  
9  For  more  on  this  approach  see  Markosian,  “A  Defense  of  Presentism.”  
10   I   am  grateful   to  Ted  Sider  and  Stephan  Torre   for  helpful   comments  on  an  earlier  
draft.  
